BOOK REVIEW
JUSTICE UNDER FIRE: A STUDY OF MILITARY LAW.
By JOSEPH W. BISHOP, JR. New York: Charterhouse, 1974.
Pp. xvi, 315. $8.95.
Charles R. Brutont
Although the United States generally is considered a violent
nation, at no time in its history has America turned from its
civilian government to seek salvation from the leader of a military force. There has never been a serious attempt by the
American military to seize control of the government by force.
Doubtless there are complex historical reasons for this good fortune, but one of the best is the Constitution's requirement of
civilian control of the military.'
On a different level, a major reason for the absence of political power in the military is the traditional ambivalence of
Americans toward military service. On the one hand, few Americans relish the prospect of taking orders, obeying petty disciplinary rules, paying elaborate courtesies to strangers distinguished only by seniority in rank, and being subjected to risks
they might consider unnecessary. This is consistent with the
strong American tradition of individual freedom of choice in
which the military symbolizes, perhaps more clearly than any
other institution except prisons, the loss of personal liberty to the
control of the state. On the other hand, Americans in uniform
traditionally have served well in times of war and national
emergency. This is consistent with what I believe to be the fundamental recognition of most Americans that the raison d'etre of
the military is to defend freedom and democracy in a world
where those institutions are the exception rather than the rule.
The public's view of the military is affected by innumerable
interdependent factors. Instances of monumental waste, bungling, arrogance, and corruption are hardly unknown. 2 Int B.A. 1968, Northwestern University; J.D. 1971, Stanford University. Member,
Pennsylvania, California, and Oklahoma Bars.
1 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8; art. II, § 2.
2 Consider, for example, the case of U.S. Air Force General John D. Lavelle, the
commander of Air Force units in southeast Asia who was relieved of command for
ordering unauthorized bombing attacks on North Vietnam in violation of orders from
the President. He was subsequently retired at the reduced rank of lieutenant general;
however, he managed to qualify for a seventy percent physical disability rating and
thereby avoided the effect of the punishment. See N.Y. Times, June 2, 1972, at 1, col. 2.
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stances of courage, selflessness, and devotion to duty, however,
clearly are admired by the majority of Americans. 3 The importance of each such instance to the overall public standing of the
military depends in large measure on the amount and tone of
coverage given to it in the media. From this emerges a single
truth: The public image bf the American military fluctuates
dramatically but rarely reaches total approval or total condemnation. One aspect of the military establishment, however, consistently is distorted in the public perception: law and justice in the
American military. This subject is known to the public almost
exclusively through courts-martial that receive heavy coverage in
the media, 4 and the resulting image tends not to reflect the
realities of this "special kind of justice."5
Responding to "popular polemics ' 6 on military law which he
considers "worthless" '7 and "baloney, '8 Professor Joseph W.
Bishop, Jr. has written Justice Under Fire:A Study of Military Law
to correct the distorted image of military justice held by most of
the public. Professor Bishop's objective is
to describe and discuss [military law's] constitutional
basis, its procedures and peculiarities, its jurisdiction,
and its relation to the rest of our policy with as much
objectivity and fairness as [he] can muster and to suggest some ways in which it could further approximate civilian norms without compromising military
efficiency. 9
Although many will question Professor Bishop's "objectivity and
fairness," and most will note that he expends far more effort on
the former than the latter objective, Justice Under Fire offers a
strong argument in favor of maintaining a separate and distinct
body of "Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land
10
and naval Forces."
3 Consider, for example, the respect and admiration demonstrated by Americans for
American prisoners of war who were released by the North Vietnamese in 1973. See, e.g.,
N.Y. 4 Times, Apr. 7, 1973, at 23, col. 4.
E.g., N.Y. Times, Jan. 6, 1973, at 23, col. 1 (the Kitty Hawk incident).
5Sherman, Book Review, 84 YALE L.J. 373 (1974). Professor Sherman, one of the
leading scholars in the field of military law, has written a thorough and fair-minded
review of Justice Under Fire, which has obviated the need for a detailed analysis of the
book. I commend his review to anyone interested in this field of law. Professor Sherman's
review, like Professor Bishop's book, nevertheless, tends to overlook the practical realities
of military justice.
6J. BISHOP, JUSTICE UNDER FIRE: A STUDY OF MILITARY LAW Xii (1974) [hereinafter
cited as BISHOP].
7Id. xiii.
8
Id.xiv.

9Id. xv.
10 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
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The book is divided into eight chapters which address the
historical background of American military law, the structure of
the court-martial system, the jurisdiction of courts-martial, the
individual rights of members of the armed forces, the war
power, martial law, and the international law of war. The concluding chapter all too briefly offers several intelligent recommendations for continued reform of the military justice system.
Unfortunately, the book does not achieve great depth in any of
the topics it considers, and, contrary to the opinion of another
reviewer, it is not a "classic of intelligent scholarship."" On the
contrary, the book is based on a conception of the military justice
system that is out of date and out of touch with reality.
Justice Under Fire arrives at a moment when there may be a
climate of sufficient sanity "to take a long and unemotional look
at the military law of the United States and to consider what
changes might really improve it."'12 The period immediately fol-

lowing a war almost inevitably is conducive to a higher degree of
self-evaluation than is possible when men are dying on foreign
battlefields or when the memory of military excesses is no longer
fresh in the public mind.
The aim of this Review is not only to evaluate Professor
Bishop's book, but also to provide a commentary on the realities
of representing military clients and to suggest additional areas
for analysis and change. 1 The focus of this Review will be on the
second, third, fourth, and concluding chapters of the book. The
other chapters, which constitute almost half the book, doubtless
will be of great interest to the historian and political scientist, but
they have little relevance to the practice of military law.
Although it is not the common practice, it might be useful to
reveal several of my own biases before analyzing those of Professor Bishop. First, I believe that criminal justice in the American
military is for the most part fundamentally fair, at least in the
11 Bunting, Book Review, N.Y. Times, July 14, 1974, § 7 (Book Review), at 2.

BISHOp, supra note 6, at 299.
11 This Review is intended to supplement that published recently by Professor Sherman, see note 5 supra, by providing first-hand evidence based on personal experience
with the workings and problems of military justice. As such, this Review contains many
statements of fact and opinion based solely on my recollections.
I recently completed a tour of duty as a lieutenant in the Judge Advocate General's
Corps of the U.S. Navy. Over three years of this tour were served at the Naval Legal
Service Office (formerly Law Center), Naval Base, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. While
there, I served successively as a defense counsel, trial counsel (prosecutor), and military
judge and participated in over 700 courts-martial, 500 of those as a military judge. As will
rapidly become evident, the views stated in this Book Review are personal and should not
be construed as necessarily reflecting the policies or opinions of any department, branch
or official of the United States Government.
12
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conduct of special and general courts-martial. 1 4 This view is the
product of three years' experience as a Navy lawyer during
which I served as defense counsel, prosecutor, and special
court-martial military judge, at a command handling in excess of
five hundred special and general courts-martial per year. The
young lawyers who administer the military justice system generally exhibit a high degree of integrity, often to the detriment of
their personal interest as military officers. The initial inexperience of these young attorneys rapidly is remedied by the assignment of a heavy caseload within days of reporting for duty after
their training in military justice. Almost none of the young
lawyers I have encountered has the slightest interest in a military
career, and they tend not to care to any great extent about the
fitness reports made about them by their superiors. This is not to
say that they are irresponsible idealists who try causes rather
than cases; rather, they perform their function honestly in an
institutional setting not conducive to the adversary process,
where they find their efforts often viewed with disrespect if not
outright disdain.
The second reason that leads me to believe American military justice is fair is that the 'jurors" (officers and enlisted per'4 See Uniform Code of Military Justice arts.
16-76, 10 U.S.C. §§ 816-76 (1970).
Special and general courts-martial are the forums in which almost all criminal cases of
any consequence are handled in the military. Minor cases are disposed of either by
nonjudicial punishment or by summary courts-martial. See Uniform Code of Military
Justice arts. 15-16, 20, 24, 10 U.S.C. §§ 815-16, 820, 824 (1970); MANUAL FOR
COURTS-MARTIAL UNITED STATES
5(c), 16, 128-35 (rev. ed. 1969) [hereinafter cited as
MCM]. For an accurate and brief description of the mechanical structure of the military
justice system, see Sherman, Military Justice Without Military Control, 82 YALE L.J. 1398,
1398-99 n.6 (1973). For an excellent discussion of the nonjudicial punishment system, see
Note, The UnconstitutionalBurden of Article 15, 82 YALE L.J. 1481 (1973); Imwinkelried &
Gilligan, The UnconstitutionalBurden of Article 15: A Rebuttal, 83 YALE L.J. 534 (1974).
The summary court-martial has become somewhat more fair with the requirement
that the accused must be represented by counsel or confinement cannot be imposed. See
United States v. Alderman, 22 U.S.C.M.A. 298, 46 C.M.R. 298 (1973). See also Betonie v.
Sizemore, 496 F.2d 1001 (5th Cir. 1974).
Something that is usually overlooked in commentary on nonjudicial punishment and
summary courts-martial is that they are among the best tools available to the defense
counsel in bargaining with a convening authority who has referred a case to trial by
special or general court-martial. It is quite common for a defense counsel to try to
persuade a convening authority to withdraw a case and handle it through nonjudicial punishment or a summary court-martial (preferably the latter, because it does not
constitute a "federal conviction" as does a court-martial). See United States v. Montgomery, 20 U.S.C.M.A. 35, 42 C.M.R. 227 (1970). I have seen many serious cases reduced to
nonjudicial punishment because a defense counsel persuaded a convening authority that
the accused deserved leniency or that the defense would deplete the convening
authority's budget by bringing witnesses to trial from distant locations. The convening
authority was offered the attractive alternative of saving time and expense without letting
the accused escape punishment. I believe that few defense counsel would vote for the
abolition of nonjudicial punishment or summary courts-martial.
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sonnel) are honest, even though they are hand-picked by the
commander who convenes a court-martial. 1 5 They decide cases
on the basis of evidence presented in open court rather than
what they know to be the general desires of the commander. As
a rule, 'jury duty" in the military is considered a waste of time
and not useful in furthering one's interests or career. Obtaining
members for a court-martial board is one of the least rewarding
tasks in the military, because almost every potential member has
several excuses why his time can be used more profitably doing
something else. The panel usually is drawn from the ranks of
junior officers and senior enlisted personnel, and as far as I have
been able to tell, there is an affirmative desire among military
commanders to include members of minority groups, including
females, on these boards. It may be that the convening authorities consider the time of those appointed less valuable than
that of those not chosen. Nonetheless, I have found military
juries generally to be well-educated, honest, attentive to the evidence, obedient to the instructions of the military judge, more
likely to acquit than to convict, and more lenient in sentencing
than most military judges. Thus, the military defendant's loss of
a right to trial by a civilian jury is not a significant loss.
Finally, I think military justice fair because of the pro16
cedural safeguards of the Uniform Code of Military Justice
(UCMJ) and the enforcement of those safeguards by those reviewing courts-martial in the military's appellate system. 17 It is
undeniable that the accused in the military has more procedural
protection of his constitutional rights than his civilian
counterpart.' 8 The absence of the fifth amendment right to indictment by a grand jury is the most prominent omission in
20
military law, 19 but the presence of article 32 of the UCMJ,
Uniform Code of Military Justice arts. 22-25, 10 U.S.C. §§ 822-25 (1970).
10 U.S.C. §§ 830-54 (1970).
1 Uniform Code of Military Justice arts. 59-76, 10 U.S.C. §§ 859-76 (1970).
18See Moyer, Procedural Rights of the Military Accused: Advantages Over a Civilian
Defendant, 22 ME. L. REv. 105 (1970); Quinn, Some ComparisonsBetween Courts-Martialand
Civilian Practice, 15 U.C.L.A.L. REV. 1240 (1968).
15 The fifth amendment specifically exempts from its requirements "cases arising in
the land or naval forces, or in the militia, when in actual service in time of war or public
danger." U.S. CONST. amend. V. As Professor Bishop states, "The grand jury is, of
course, unknown to military law." BisHoP, supra note 6, at 35; see Ex parte Quirin, 317
'-

16 Uniform Code of Military Justice arts. 30-54,

U.S. 1, 40 (1942).
20 Uniform Code of Military Justice art. 32, 10 U.S.C. § 832 (1970). Article 32(b) sets

forth the basic rights of an accused in a pretrial hearing as follows:
The accused shall be advised of the charges against him and of his right to
be represented at that investigation by counsel. Upon his own request he shall be
represented by civilian counsel if provided by him, or military counsel of his
own selection if such counsel is reasonably available, or by counsel detailed by
the officer exercising general court-martial jurisdiction over the command. At

1975]

BOOK REVIEW

unquestionably the best pretrial discovery device for the defense
known to American criminal law, makes this omission more a
blessing than a burden.2 1 Professor Bishop correctly says that "in
most matters of procedure and evidence the rights of the soldier
defendant, if they differ from the civilian's, are likely to differ
for the better. ' 22 The military system of appellate review, at least
in matters of form and questions of admissibility of evidence, is
rigorous. 23 As a military judge, I decided close questions of evidence in favor of the defense on many occasions, because I
firmly believed that ruling for the government might lead to an
unnecessary reversal of an otherwise fair trial.
that investigation full opportunity sfiall be given to the accused to cross-examine
witnesses against him if they are available and to present anything he may desire
in his own behalf, either in defense or mitigation, and the investigating officer
shall examine available witnesses requested by the accused. If the charges are
forwarded after the investigation, they shall be accompanied by a statement of
the substance of the testimony taken on both sides and a copy thereof shall be
given to the accused.
These protections are superior to those available to an accused facing a grand jury.
On the other hand, an article 32 investigation is required only as a predicate to a
general court-martial and does not apply to cases referred to trial by special courtmartial. In such cases, a "preliminary inquiry" usually is made, but this is merely an
informal inquiry to determine the sufficiency of the evidence. See MCM, supra note 14,
32-33.
The article 32 investigating officer "should be a mature officer, preferably an officer
of the grade of major or lieutenant commander or higher, or one with legal training and
experience." MCM, supra note 14, 34. As a general rule investigating officers are line
officers without legal training. In such cases the Government counsel tends to have a very
free rein to present whatever evidence he can find that points to the guilt of the accused.
If the investigating officer is particularly taciturn, he may permit the Government counsel
to threaten, cajole, or even intimidate witnesses. He is invariably advised prior to the
hearing that he can prevent any possibility of having the case returned simply by stating,
"Your objection is noted," whenever either counsel makes an objection.
At least in the Navy, it is not uncommon for the article 32 investigating officer to be
a lawyer, often one serving as a special court-martial military judge. In these cases the
hearing tends to be much more a quasi-judicial proceeding in which incompetent evidence is rejected and proper decorum is maintained. Having sat as an article 32 investigating officer in over twenty-five serious cases, I feel confident in recommending that,
barring exigent circumstances, the investigating officer in all cases should be an attorney.
21 There is sound reason to believe that the fifth amendment guarantee of the right
to indictment by grand jury is of little value to an accused. See Note, American GrandJuiy:
Investigatory and Indictment Powers, 22 CLEV. ST. L. REv. 136 (1973). As one student writer
commented: "The grand jury, once viewed as a valuable constitutional right and defender of personal liberty, has come to be an agency of the government prosecutor and a
potential threat to civil liberties. Its accusatory role greatly overshadows its protective
role." Note, The GrandJury:Powers, Proceduresand Problems, 9 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROB.
681, 730 (1973).
2 BISHOP, supra note 6, at 38; see Moyer, supra note 18.
23 Perhaps because of the technical statutory nature of military law and perhaps
because most reviewing authorities in the military justice system tend to be bureaucrats,
there is an almost overwhelming emphasis on matters of form in the hundreds of decisions by the Courts of Military Review and the Court of Military Appeals that I have had
occasion to read.
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The second bias I shall mention is my belief that justice in
the American military is fairer than civilian justice, again with
the proviso that I refer only to special and general courtsmartial. 2 4 First, as mentioned above, the military defendant has
extensive rights to pretrial discovery such that he almost always
has notice of the Government's entire case against him.2 5 Second, in the military, unlike the civilian world, the right of the
accused to a speedy trial is not a hollow promise. Partly in response to the absence of bail in the military,26 the Court of
Military Appeals (COMA) has decreed that all charges and
specifications against an accused must be dismissed unless his
trial has begun within ninety days of the commencement of pretrial confinement, absent extraordinary circumstances or proven
defense delay. 7 Moreover, again on pain of dismissal, COMA
has decreed that the record must be typed, certified by the military judge, and reviewed by the convening authority within
ninety days of completion of the trial if the accused has been in
post-trial confinement for ninety days.28
The military defendant not only is tried more promptly
than his civilian counterpart, but he is likely to be better represented. Although the Code permits the use of non-lawyer defense counsel in special courts-martial when a lawyer cannot be
obtained "on account of physical conditions or military
exigencies,

'2 9

the prosecutor in such cases also must be a

24 See note 14 supra.
25 See text accompanying notes 19-21 supra.
26 See Uniform Code of Military Justice arts. 10, 13, 10 U.S.C. §§ 810, 813 (1970);
MCM, supra note 14,
17-22. See also Levy v. Resor, 17 U.S.C.M.A. 135, 37 C.M.R. 399
(1967); United States v. Hangselben, 8 U.S.C.M.A. 320, 323, 24 C.M.R. 130, 133 (1957).
Article 13 of the UCMJ provides that the conditions of pretrial restraint cannot be
more rigorous than the circumstances require to insure [the accused's] presence."
Uniform Code of Military Justice art. 13, 10 U.S.C. § 813 (1970). The Court of Appeals
for the Eighth Circuit recently ruled that the UCMJ test is sound, but that the procedures
for obtaining release from pretrial confinement are unconstitutional as a denial of due
process. DeChamplain v. Lovelace, 43 U.S.L.W. 2349 (8th Cir. Feb. 25, 1975). The
accused, an Air Force master sergeant, was held in pretrial confinement on espionage
charges for almost four years. The court found that the military's procedure for release
from pretrial confinement denied the accused due process for three reasons. First, the
decision whether pretrial confinement was necessary was made not by a neutral officer or
judge but by the convening authority who instituted the investigation and urged the
prosecution of the accused. Second, the accused was not permitted to appear before a
neutral officer or judge before being ordered into confinement, or within a reasonable
time thereafter, so that he might present evidence relevant to the necessity for pretrial
confinement. Third, the system required the accused to show why he should not be
confined rather than requiring that the government bear the burden of proving that
pretrial confinement was necessary. Id.
7
2 See United States v. Marshall, 22 U.S.C.M.A. 431, 47 C.M.R. 409 (1973); United
States v. Burton, 21 U.S.C.M.A. 112, 118, 44 C.M.R. 166, 172 (1971).
2' See Dunlap v. Convening Authority, 23 U.S.C.M.A. 135, 48 C.M.R. 751 (1974).
29 Uniform Code of Military Justice art. 27, 10 U.S.C. § 827 (1970).
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non-lawyer.3 ° In fact, I neither saw nor heard of an accused
being represented by non-lawyer counsel in a special courtmartial during my years in uniform, although I saw many instances of non-lawyers struggling as prosecutors in minor cases
when lawyer-prosecutors were unavailable.
The lawyer who defends the accused usually is not from the
latter's command and has little or no interest in the goodwill of
the convening authority. Unlike most civilian public defenders,
he will have sufficient time to prepare his case, and he will not
see the accused for the first time on the morning of trial. An
unprepared defense counsel is not unknown in the military, but
I know of no denial of a continuance when a defense counsel
requested additional time for preparation. 3 1 In lieu of or in addition to his detailed military lawyer, the accused can be defended by either civilian counsel at his own expense or by any
other military lawyer at government
expense if the requested
' '32
lawyer is "reasonably available.
Finally, military justice is better than civilian justice because
the military confinement facilities and programs for pretrial and
post-trial restraint are superior. 33 Persons awaiting trial must be
34
segregated from those who have been convicted of crimes. "If
30

/d.

31 See Uniform Code of Military Justice art. 40, 10 U.S.C. § 840 (1970); MCM, supra
note 14, 58. Whether a continuance should be granted is an interlocutory question on
which the ruling of the military judge is final and not subject to review by the convening
authority. See United States v. Kinard, 21 U.S.C.M.A. 300, 305-07, 45 C.M.R. 74, 79-81
(1972).
32 Uniform Code of Military Justice art. 38(b), 10 U.S.C. § 838(b) (1970); MCM,
supra note 14,
46-48; see United States v. Jordan, 22 U.S.C.M.A. 164, 46 C.M.R. 164
(1973).
Depending on the circumstances, the right to individual military counsel can be a
potent weapon for the defense. Because the expense of bringing individual military
counsel to trial is borne by the government, the defense can "raise the ante" substantially
by making such a request. But there is broad latitude for corruption in this area, because
the decision whether a requested military lawyer is available is made by that lawyer's
commanding officer, subject to review by the next higher authority. MCM, supra note 14,
48(b). There tends to be a form of reciprocity in these cases whereby senior lawyers assure that a requested individual military counsel is too busy to be relieved of his present
duties for even a brief period of time. See United States v. Barton, 48 C.M.R. 358
(N.C.M.R. 1973).
'3 See Herrod, The United States DisciplinaryBarracksSystem, 8 MILITARY L. REv. 35, 72
(1960); Kennedy, The U.S. Air Force PrisonerRetraining Program, 34 FED. PROBATION 39
(Sept. 1970); Wilberding, The Progressive Penal System at The United States Disciplinary
Barracks, 31 FED. B.J. 44 (1972). Compare Plotkin, Surviving Justice: Prisoners'Rights to be
Free From Physical Assault, 23 CLEV. ST. L. REv. 387 (1974) and Hirschkop & Millemann,
The Unconstitutionality of Prison Life, 55 VA. L. Rav. 795 (1969), with Habeck & Bond,
Mental Health and Humanization: The Military Approach to Penology, 38 FED. PROBATION 50
(Sept. 1974) (describing one model correctional facility). But see Plotkin, The Unknown
Soldiers: The Plight of Military Prisoners, 22 AM. U.L. REv. (1973). See generally MIUTARY
PRISONS (S. Brodsky & N. Eggleston eds. 1970).
14 See Uniform Code of Military Justice art. 13, 10 U.S.C. § 813 (1970); MCM, supra
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practicable," those serving sentences rendered by courts-martial
must be segregated from those serving nonjudicial punishment. 35 The persons administering military confinement
facilities are trained and, more importantly, the facilities and
personnel are inspected regularly. The atmosphere of a military
confinement facility is marked by order and discipline, but there
is almost no brutality, homosexual rape, or arbitrary additional
punishment, although occasionally there are cases of interracial
conflict. From what I have seen, military confinement facilities
are clean, the food is good, the medical care is better than that
given to those not in confinement, and psychiatric, religious, and
legal aid are readily available. There appears to be at least some
desire to rehabilitate or at least to help all interested confinees
avoid future antisocial behavior, whether they are staying in the
military or being discharged. In essence, the military's system of
restraint and confinement has many features most civilian
penologists desire to see implemented at civilian confinement
facilities.
The final bias I will mention here is my belief that the fairness of the military justice system and its superiority to its civilian
counterpart do not excuse failure to examine it critically, reveal
its corruptions and failures, experiment with unconventional alternatives, and strive to perfect the best possible system for resolving criminal cases and rehabilitating those convicted. Herein
lies the great flaw of Justice Under Fire, for, despite a few suggestions for continued reform, Professor Bishop fails to identify the
true weaknesses of the military justice system or even to recommend comprehensive solutions to those problems he has identified.
Justice Under Fire is bottomed on its author's belief that modern military justice "is not a debasement and corruption of the
ordinary criminal process in the interest of military discipline,
but a very gradual and still partial homologization of civilian
criminal justice by a penal system with totally different purposes
and origins. '3 6 Although one must concede that military criminal
law has origins different from its civilian counterpart, Professor
Bishop is wrong about its purposes. Military law is simply a
branch of American criminal law, with the same general goals of
maintaining order in society by the deterrence of antisocial benote 14, 125. See also Walker v. Commanding Officer, 19 U.S.C.M.A. 247, 41 C.M.R.
247 (1970); United States v. Nelson, 18 U.S.C.M.A. 177, 39 C.M.R. 177 (1969); United
States v. Bayhand, 6 U.S.C.M.A. 762, 21 C.M.R. 84 (1956); United States v.Cordova, 42
C.M.R. 466 (A.C.M.R. 1970).
'5 See MCM, supra note 14, 131(c)(4).
36 BIsHoP, supra note 6, at 5.
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havior and the rehabilitation of offenders. The military justice
system is required to resolve the same fundamental questions as
every other system of criminal justice. Those questions are: (1)
what conduct should be defined as "criminal"; (2) what decisions
should be made by which methods before a person can be convicted of a criminal offense; and (3) what should be done with
persons who are found guilty.3 7 Professor Bishop focuses on the
second problem, mentions the first, and neglects the third.3 8 The
last is particularly unfortunate, because the most defensible aspect of military justice is its corrections system. 39 In any case, it is
fair to say thatJustice Under Fire is concerned primarily with the
form and function of American military law and not with its
substance.
Although no true believer in the righteousness of American
military law will find complete solace injustice Under Fire, in the
final analysis the book defends and advocates the maintenance
of that separate system of criminal justice.40 In that limited
sense, it can be viewed as a defense of the status quo, an enormously difficult and unpopular undertaking these days. The logical starting point for evaluation is Professor Bishop's argument
for the continued separation of military law from the rest of
American criminal law.
Purporting to describe rather than advance the arguments
in favor of a separate system of military justice, Professor Bishop
presents what he considers the "best statement" of the "military
discipline argument." The argument is that the military's "demands justify a procedure that does lessen the chance of unjust
acquittal, while it need not, and should not, increase the possibility of unjust conviction."141 The rationale of this argument is
based on the unprovable assumption, accepted by Bishop, that
there is a compelling "need to maintain efficiency, obedience
and order in an army, which is an aggregation of men (mostly in
most criminally prone age brackets) who have strong appetites,
strong passions, and ready access to deadly weapons. ' 42 According to Professor Bishop's logic, the danger posed by this group is
the justification for its separate treatment. He states:

3

7 See

H. PACKER, THE LIMITs OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 17 (1968).
Professor Bishop does discuss the problem of the bad conduct discharge and
recommends its abolition. BISHOP, supra note 6, at 95, 301-02.
38

3' See notes 33-36 & accompanying text.
40

Professor Bishop states: "I do not favor abolition of the separate system of military

justice, nor even complete elimination of the military commander's role in it." BISHOP,

supra41note 6, at 300.
Id.23.
42

Id.
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An army without discipline is in fact more dangerous
to the civil population (including that of its own country) than to the enemy. The public interest in discipline
is therefore entitled to greater weight, and the rights of
the accused to lesser
weight, in the military than in the
43
civilian context.
Hence, the conclusion: "Military discipline cannot be maintained
by the civilian criminal process, which is neither swift nor
' 44
certain.
I find the logic of the "military discipline" argument unsound. There is a compelling need to maintain order and the
rule of law in every segment of society, but that need does not
justify imposing a separate judicial system on any group found
to be "dangerous. ' 45 The crimes committed by "dangerous" persons against civil rights workers in the South in years past generally went unpunished, but they did not provoke an outcry for
the use of military tribunals to stem the problem. 46 It can be
argued that in a free society open to constant changes in values
and lifestyles, the discipline and order of a standing military
establishment, when permitted to become substantially different
from that of the public, render that institution "dangerous" to
the very freedoms it was created to protect. The examples of
military takeovers in Greece 47 and more recently in Chile4 8 come
to mind. Philosophical problems of this variety are not resolvable
with any degree of certainty, for the currents of the disagreement run deeply into political philosophy, personal experience,
and behavioral assumptions. My experience as a military lawyer
has convinced me that there is no compelling reason for the
continued maintenance of a separate system of military justice.
Still, certain realities must be recognized. One characteristic
of nationhood in this imperfect world is the ability to wage war,
and war is waged for the purpose of imposing, albeit defensively,
43

Id. 21.

44Id.

41 Indeed, the District Court for the Western District of Missouri recently held unconstitutional a section of the 1970 Organized Crime Control Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3575-78
(1970), that permitted imposing "dangerous special offender" sentences on dangerous
professional criminals. United States v. Duardi, 384 F. Supp. 874, 883 (W.D. Mo. 1974).
The court struck down 18 U.S.C. § 3575(f), which permitted extended sentences for
persons convicted of felonies "if a period of confinement longer than that provided for
such felony is required for the protection of the public from further criminal conduct by
the defendant." The provision was held unconstitutionally vague and violative of due
process.
46 Professor Bishop discusses this example in the context of using military tribunals
to maintain domestic order. See BISHOP, supra note 6, at 248-49.
47
See N.Y. Times, Apr. 23, 1967, at 1, col. 8.
48 See N.Y. Times, Sept. 12, 1973, at 1, col. 8.
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one nation's will upon another. "[T]he primary business of armies and navies [is] to fight or be ready to fight wars should the
occasion arise. '4 9 Stated differently, members of the military are
called upon to kill, to be killed, and to order others to do the
same. No matter how bitter this task and its attendant risks may
be, such is the duty of all persons in uniform. As the Supreme
Court recently recognized:
While members of the military community enjoy many
of the same rights and bear many of the same burdens
as do members of the civilian community, within the
military community there is simply not the same autonomy as there is in the larger civilian community. The
military establishment is subject to the control of the
civilian commander in chief and the civilian departmental heads under him, and its function is to carry out the
50
policies made by those civilian superiors.
Since the military's primary function is to carry out orders to
'5 1
subdue or kill an enemy, "[i]ts law is that of obedience.
Whether this situation merely "is" or "should be" is beyond the
scope of this Review. But the question is surely one of the most
perplexing and important in the area, and it deserves more
analysis thanJustice Under Fire provides.
Having established reasons he considers sufficient to justify
the continued existence of the separate system of military law,
Professor Bishop attempts to give the reader an overview of
American courts-martial and their procedures, contrasting those
proceedings with their civilian counterparts. 5 The author briefly
considers the military's equivalent to the civilian system of jury
selection, describing it as "the major difference between military
and civilian practice. '53 He notes that permitting the commander
who has referred the accused to trial to select the members who
will decide the merits and, if necessary, the sentence, lets the
commander "pack the jury.' 54 Professor Bishop then mentions
the strictly construed requirement that a court-martial be convened in letter perfect compliance with the applicable statutes,
lest the judgment be reversed for lack of jurisdiction. 5 5
4 Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11, 17 (1955).
oParker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 751 (1974).
5' In re Grimley, 137 U.S. 147, 153 (1890).
BIsHoP, supra note 6, at 26-44.

Id. 27 (emphasis in original).
"' Id. 29. But see text accompanying notes 15-16 supra.
5 Id. 29-30; see Runkle v. United States, 122 U.S. 543, 555-56 (1887); United States
v. White, 21 U.S.C.M.A. 583, 45 C.M.R. 357 (1972); United States v. Singleton, 21
U.S.C.M.A. 432, 45 C.M.R. 206 (1972).
'
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Having conceded that the system for selecting military juries
is unfair (which it is, although, as a rule, fair-minded "jurors" are
eventually selected56), Professor Bishop sets forth his major defense of the military justice system, the role of the military
judge.5 7 He makes his view of the military trial judiciary clear
from the outset:
A long step in the process of assimilating military trials
to the civilian variety has been the creation and expansion of the powers of the Military Judge, who resembles
a civilian trial judge much more closely
than the mem58
bers of the court resemble jurors.
The essential reason why the military judge's presence renders
the system defensible, in Bishop's view, is that the judge is free
from that oldest bugaboo of military law, command influence. 59
The commander who convenes the court-martial selects the
members; designates the trial judge, prosecutor, and defense
counsel; and refers the accused to trial cannot influence the
military judge directly (by the use of adverse fitness reports or
other means), and the accused can choose to be tried before the
military judge sitting alone. 60 For these reasons, according to
Bishop, the system is fair. 6 ' I think Professor Bishop is wrong,
both about the inherent independence of the military judge and
the ultimate fairness resulting from his presence.
In the final analysis every legal institution depends on the
integrity and honesty of the men who administer it. Yet there
are ways to limit and control the independence of any judicial
institution. Federal judges are appointed for life "during good
Behaviour, ' 62 and Congress has no power to reduce their compensation during their tenure on the bench. 63 As a general rule,
civilian judges are successful and experienced attorneys who

'6See text accompanying

note 15 supra.

"I BISHOP, supra note 6, at 30-33.

58
Id.30.
5

Id. 31, 100, 300; see Uniform Code of Military Justice arts. 26, 36, 10 U.S.C. §§
826, 836 (1970); MCM, supra note 14, 38. See also United States v. Cordova, 42 C.M.R.
466, 470 (A.C.M.R. 1970). Even Justice Douglas has noted that the military has made
"strenuous efforts to eliminate the danger [of command influence]." O'Callahan v.
Parker, 395 U.S. 258, 264 (1969) (footnote omitted).
61See Uniform Code of Military Justice art. 16, 10 U.S.C. § 816 (1970); MCM, supra
note 14,
4(a), 53(d)(2). President Ford recently changed the language of paragraph
53(d)(2) of the Manualfor Courts-Martial, but the change only amounted to an expansion
and clarification of the former rule. See Exec. Order No. 11835, 40 Fed. Reg. 4247
(1975).
61 BISHOP, supra note 6, at 100.
62
-U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
63

1d

.
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enter the judiciary after years of private practice in which they
have earned some degree of distinction. Many accept a major
reduction in income to accept a judicial position. The quality of
civilian judges varies but is usually high enough to maintain the
respect of the civilian bar. Civilian judges seem to have little
difficulty detaching themselves from prior connections they may
have had with the state or federal government. This may be due
in part to civilian judges' lack of interest in returning to govern64
ment positions outside the judiciary.
In contrast, the process by which certain officers are selected
for the military trial judiciary is a mystery. There are no qualifications defined by statute or regulation. No selection board
meets to review the records of candidates. There is no solicitation to determine interest among available judge advocates. Positions are filled as the need arises, and choices may be based on
such criteria as the expense of transferring a particular military
lawyer to a distant post or a lawyer's winning a major case for the
prosecution. One becomes a military judge by being certified by
his armed service's Judge Advocate General. 65 One can come to
the attention of his Judge Advocate General in many ways, but
usually he is nominated by his local commanding officer.66 While
some surely will contest the point, my experience suggests that
military judges are selected on the basis of career orientation and
success as prosecutors. I know of no military judge who attained
certification on the basis of a winning record as a defense counsel, although I know of many military judges who earned their
jobs by consistently winning cases for the Government.
Once certified as a military judge, one awaits orders to sit on
courts-martial. Such orders come from the convening authority,
who supposedly can designate any certified military judge. 67 In
practice, the convening authority can do very little 'judge shopping" because he can detail only those military judges who are
"available." The convening authority usually has no choice and
must detail the judge who has been assigned by the Judge Advocate General to hear courts-martial in that particular geographical area.
64 Consider, for example, the case of Federal DistrictJudge Matthew Byrne who was
offered the position of Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation when he happened to be in the midst of trying Daniel Ellsberg. Judge Byrne declined the offer
without hesitation.
"sSee Uniform Code of Military Justice art. 26, 10 U.S.C. § 826 (1970); MCM, supra
note 14, 4(e). See also United States v. Moorehead, 20 U.S.C.M.A. 574, 44 C.M.R. 4
(1971).
66See text accompanying notes 85-86 infra.
"7See Uniform Code of Military Justice art. 26, 10 U.S.C. § 826 (1970); MCM, supra
note 14, 4(e)-(g).
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The military judge administers justice in courtrooms that
are usually inadequate if not degrading, particularly in special
courts-martial. 68 Only in the Army is the military judge permitted to wear a judicial robe; 69 judges from the other services sit in
uniform. By and large, the military judge hears a plethora of
unauthorized absence charges, occasionally interrupted by a case
of alleged assault, larceny, disobedience of orders, disrespect to a
superior, or violation of the drug laws. He can order charges
dismissed, but his ruling is subject to reversal by the convening
authority 70 whose decision then is reviewed after trial, by which
time the accused may have served any period of confinement to
which he has been sentenced. Depending on the defense
counsel's assessment of the judge's honesty, fairness, and leniency, the military judge is likely to hear most of his cases sitting
alone. 71 Most cases involve guilty pleas, leaving sentencing as the
major function of the trial judge. The military judge cannot
order the release of an accused from pretrial confinement, suspend any sentence or order probation, or stay the execution of a
sentence pending appeal. He can only recommend such actions
to the convening authority as matters of leniency. In essence, he
administers justice for junior enlisted personnel in a misdemeanor court lacking the usual trappings and authority of the
American civilian judiciary.
The military trial judiciary is made up largely of "regular"
or "career-oriented" legal officers whose tenure on the bench is
no more than one tour of duty spanning, at most, a few years in
a long military career. Although appointments to the trial
judiciary are sought after by young military lawyers and often
are used as an incentive to persuade individuals to remain in
uniform, the military judiciary is a dead-end for the ambitious
military lawyer. This is because every military judge, no matter
how prosecution-oriented, sooner or later must rule against the
68 The Manual for Courts-Martial provides for a seating arrangement, but this depends upon "the size and arrangement of the courtroom." MCM, supra note 14, 6 1(b);
see id. app. 8(b). Of course, there can be exigent circumstances justifying the use of a
ship's wardroom or a field tent as a courtroom, but such occasions are rare. Most
courts-martial are held at the headquarters of well-established military bases where the
only reason for an inadequate courtroom is that the line officers who control space
allocation object to "wasting" space on criminals. During the eighteen months I sat as a
military judge, I waited in vain for some bright defense counsel to make a motion for
appropriate relief on the ground that the courtroom was inadequate and degrading to
the court. I would have granted such a motion in many cases.
69 It has been rumored that certain judges of the Navy and Air Force have ventured
into the courtroom in judicial robes during recent months.
70 See Uniform Code of Military Justice art. 62(a), 10 U.S.C. § 62(a) (1970). See also
Priest v. Koch, 19 U.S.C.M.A. 293, 41 C.M.R. 293 (1970).
71See note 60 supra & accompanying text. For example, as a military judge I heard
more than ninety-five percent of my cases sitting alone.
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interests of the Government on an important matter, thereby
disappointing or frustrating someone at the command level who
may exert a negative influence on the judge's career. In essence,
the military is a poor place in which to be neutral and a very
poor place in which to rule in favor of the defense regularly.
Thus, the linchpin of Professor Bishop's defense of the fairness of the military justice is open to serious question. Although
many talented and intelligent military judges perform their
function with great integrity, no military judge has sufficient
judicial independence to administer a criminal justice system
fairly. At best, he can be honest and try to overcome the gnawing
suspicion that he may be transferred to some forgotten corner of
the globe if he rules for the accused too often. Contrast that
situation to the action of Chief Judge Sirica in ordering the
President of the United States to produce for inspection and
possible disclosure tape recordings of secret discussions involving
the President, 72 or the action of Judge Matthew Byrne in dismissing criminal charges against Daniel Ellsberg on the basis of
the Government's nondisclosure of an illegal entry into the office
of Ellsberg's psychiatrist. 73 That contrast is too stark to support
Professor Bishop's conclusion that
[s]o long as the soldier has the option of trial by a
military judge, with a minimum of 'command influence,' he gets much the same process he would get, for
instance, in the courts of Japan or France or Germany,
whose juryless criminal justice is, pace Justice Douglas,
no less civilized than ours.7 4
The author next discusses the position of the military defense counsel in the court-martial system. 7 5 He attempts to rebut
the charge "that defense counsel are (a) systematically selected
for incompetence and (b) too afraid of the commander's displeasure to make a vigorous defense"7 6 with the unsupported
77
comment that "military lawyers vigorously deny the charge
and the personal insight that he has seen "very little evidence of
such incompetence or timidity in the records [he has]
examined. 17 8 He notes further that "military defense counsel
"In re Subpoena to Nixon, 360 F. Supp. 1 (D.D.C.), modified sub nom. Nixon v.
Sirica, 487 F.2d 700 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
7- United States v. Russo, Grim. No. 9373-WMB-GD (C.D. Cal., May 11, 1973).
71 BISHOP, supra note 6, at 100.
7

5 Id.
6 Id.
77Id.
7

78 Id.

33-35.
34.
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seem to me to raise as many
defenses, and push them as hard, as
7 9
lawyers in civilian trials.

On the other hand, Professor Bishop implicitly admits that
the effectiveness of the military defense counsel in recent years
may be a temporary phenomenon attributable to the draft. Because most military defense counsel in recent years have been
young lawyers who "are merely fulfilling their military service
obligation by three years or so of active duty, they are neither
bucking for promotion nor in much fear of the commander's
displeasure."8 0 Ending the draft probably portends that "most
military lawyers will be career officers"8 1 who will be susceptible
to influence from above. Bishop therefore supports the suggestion that appointed military defense counsel, like military judges,
should be assigned to a central organization, independent of the
command which convenes the court-martial.

'8 2

That Bishop

himself perceives a need to restructure the organization of military defense counsel, to give them the independence enjoyed
fortuitously by conscripts, weakens his defense of the present
system.
As a defense, Professor Bishop's view of the situation of
military defense counsel will not wash. His recommendation for
change, although an improvement, is not based on accurate facts
and does not go far enough. The Manualfor Courts-Martial, in
defining the duties of defense counsel in military trials, states
that the defense counsel "will perform such duties as usually
devolve upon the counsel for a defendant before a civilian court
in a criminal case, will guard the interests of the accused by all
honorable and legitimate means known to the law ... [and will]
represent the accused with undivided fidelity ....183 In practice,

these noble ideals are realized only partially and only by the
consistently high integrity of military defense lawyers, without
any institutional support.
Professor Bishop's fundamental error lies in his misconception of the command structure in which the military defense
counsel operates. Every lawyer in uniform is ultimately responsible to some regular officer of the line. In almost all cases the
defense counsel is detailed by the line officer who has convened
the court-martial. Yet, the military defense lawyer's immediate
superior and actual boss is usually another attorney who is serving either as a Staff Judge Advocate under a flag or general
79
80

Id.
Id.

81 Id.
82

/d.34-35.
83 MCM, supra note 14,

48(c).
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officer or as an Officer in Charge of a local law office under the
control of the Judge Advocate General of his branch of the
service. The direct influence of line officers of any rank on a
defense counsel's handling of a court-martial trial is nil.8 4 In the
well over seven hundred military criminal cases in which I participated, I never saw a lii'e officer attempt to influence a defense counsel directly. Moreover, I never saw a defense counsel
demonstrate any concern for the feelings of a convening authority about his zeal in conducting a defense, except when he8 be5
lieved the best interests of his client called for such concern.
But military defense counsel are not free from "outside"
influence. The influence exerted upon the military defense
lawyer, particularly in serious cases involving major felonies,
comes from his immediate superiors, the career military lawyers
under whom he must serve on a day-to-day basis. These senior
military lawyers often are directly responsible to more senior line
officers, and their self-interest rarely, if ever, lies with the acquittal of an accused. As a result, they have little or no incentive to
place their most competent lawyers in criminal defense work or
to support those who are assigned there. As a general rule, the
youngest lawyers with the least experience and the least resistance to pressure from superiors are assigned as defense counsel. And the pressure is soon applied by the senior lawyers.
This influence rarely is applied directly. It may consist of
such minor abrasions as transfer to a less desirable office, public
reminders to conform more closely to military grooming and
dress standards, denial of access to secretarial assistance, assign-

84 There are five situations in which a defense counsel may seek to involve line
officers in aid of the accused. First, he may seek to obtain a pretrial agreement (plea
bargain) from the convening authority. See United States v. Troglin, 21 U.S.C.M.A. 183,
44 C.M.R. 237 (1972); United States v. Sanchez, 40 C.M.R. 698 (A.G.M.R. 1969). Second,
the defense counsel may seek immunity from prosecution from a line officer with the
authority to grant it. See MCM, supra note 14, 68(h). Third, a defense counsel may assist
an accused in attempting to "resign" from the service by accepting an administrative
discharge in lieu of prosecution. In such cases, the character of the discharge is usually
less than honorable. See Lunding, Judicial Review of Military Administrative Discharges, 83
YALE L.J. 33 (1973); Comment, Punishment of Enlisted Personnel Outside the UCMJ: A
Statutory and Equal Protection Analysis of Military Discharge Certificates, 9 HARV. CIv.
RIGHTS-Cir. LIB. L. REv. 227 (1974). Fourth, a defense counsel may attempt to persuade
a convening authority to reduce a case to a summary court-martial or nonjudicial
punishment after it has been referred to trial by special or general court-martial. See note
14 supra. Fifth, a defense counsel may seek clemency from the convening authority after
a sentence has been announced, by requesting recommendations for clemency from
48(k)(1), 77(a).
court members or other line officers. See MCM, supra note 14,
85 For example, a defense counsel, faced with overwhelming evidence of guilt, who
failed to obtain a pretrial agreement acceptable to the accused might behave very
cooperatively and flexibly if the accused's best hope for a reduction of sentence was a
48(k)(1), 77(a).
post-trial clemency petition. See MOM, supra note 14,
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ment to time-consuming collateral duties such as purchasing
supplies or standing "phone watches," or denial of leave or special liberty. Once a defense counsel has truly fallen from grace
with his superiors, he may find himself handling legal assistance
or claims matters, transferred to another command, or simply
given a low rating on his fitness report. These informal devices
are usually within the sole discretion of the defense counsel's
immediate commander, and they are used more commonly than
Professor Bishop might expect.
In all fairness, I must add that on two occasions lethargic
and incompetent military defense attorneys were relieved and
transferred to other duties on my recommendation as a military
judge. Even then my recommendation was followed only after I
advised that my conscience would not permit the imposition of
otherwise appropriate sentences upon individuals represented
by these two lackluster attorneys. On the other hand, I also saw
several excellent and zealous military defense counsel transferred to "less rigorous" duties after raising the blood pressure
of the wrong senior lawyer.
Professor Bishop half-heartedly recommends the severance
of defense counsel from the foreboding omnipresence of the
Staff Judge Advocate or local law office commander as a means
of ensuring continued good performance by military defense
counsel after the "draft-induced volunteer" lawyers are replaced
by a more homogenous "career-oriented" group.8 6 Although the
recommendation has merit, it ultimately would fall short of establishing and protecting the independence and adversary spirit
essential to the adequate representation of an accused. A separate defense organization might be effective to some extent if it
were funded adequately, if it were staffed by trained investigators responsible only to the defense, if it were responsible
only to the Judge Advocate General, if its members were guaranteed promotions proportionate to those in other parts of the
military-legal community, and if its personnel were guaranteed
that they would not be transferred, even within the defense organization, for a reasonable period of years, except upon their
own request or upon a finding of incompetence by a neutral and
detached group of defense attorneys. Nothing short of this
would suffice to guarantee, as an institutional matter, independence and adversary spirit among military defense lawyers sufficient to permit them "to represent the accused with undivided
' '87
fidelity.
86
87

BISHOP, supra note 6, at 34-35, 301.

MCM, supra note 14,

48(c) (emphasis supplied).
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One of the more noteworthy omissions of Justice Under Fire
is Professor Bishop's failure to discuss the difficult position of
the trial counsel (prosecutor) in courts-martial.8 8 The Code of
Professional Responsibility states: "The responsibility of a public
prosecutor differs from that of the usual advocate; his duty is to
seek justice, not merely to convict. '8 9 Although the military
prosecutor surely is subject to this maxim, the means available
to him for compliance are limited.
The military prosecutor is a classic example of the man in
the middle. He is selected and appointed by the convening authority to represent the Government throughout the proceedings, 90 but he has little or no discretion on any significant
matter related to the trial of a case other than the choice of how
and in what order to present the evidence. He cannot refuse to
prosecute regardless of his opinion of the evidence. He cannot
demand a witness or issue a subpoena without the permission of
the convening authority. He cannot negotiate a plea bargain with
the defense that is binding on the Government, because only the
convening authority can enter into an enforceable pretrial
agreement. 9 1
Although he has no real discretion on many of the most
significant matters in a court-martial, the trial counsel is the
natural object of the ire of the military judge displeased with the
conduct of a case. Usually the only representative of the Government in the courtroom, the military prosecutor often faces
the hapless task of explaining, for example, why the convening
authority refused to release an accused from pretrial confinement even though twenty bishops have sworn that he is neither a
danger to the community nor an escape risk. 92 He often is
forced to argue why the military judge should not order the
production of a witness 93 located in a distant command when he
88 Professor Bishop mentions the trial counsel only once, in reference to the power
of the convening authority to select the trial counsel. See BISHOP, supra note 6, at 33.
For an interesting statement of a trial counsel's views on his situation, see Rehyansky,
Military Law isto Law as.... 4 JURIs DOCTOR, Dec. 1974, at 15.
89 ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY,
90

Ethical Consideration 7-13 (1971).

See Uniform Code of Military Justice arts. 27, 38, 10 U.S.C. §§ 827, 838 (1970);
MCM, supra note 14,
6, 44.
" "[A] pretrial agreement is merely a voluntary limitation by the convening authority, in advance of trial, upon his statutory discretion regarding the adjudged sentence."
United States v. Sanchez, 40 C.M.R. 698, 699 (A.C.M.R. 1969).
92 See MCM, supra note 14,
18, 20-22, 30(h). See also note 26 supra.
" The military judge has authority to order the production of a witness after a
refusal by the convening authority, and his ruling is not subject to reversal by the convening authority. See Uniform Code of Military Justice art. 46, 10 U.S.C. § 846 (1970);
MCM, supra note 14, 115; United States v. McElhinney, 21 U.S.C.M.A. 436, 45 C.M.R.
210 (1972). See also United States v. Sears, 20 U.S.C.M.A. 380, 43 C.M.R. 220 (1971).
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firmly believes that the witness can provide evidence material to
the charges before the court. Moreover, he is subject to the same
pressures, probably more overtly, as the defense counsel.
Thus the military prosecutor is expected to perform the
same function as his civilian counterpart, although he has less
discretion than a civilian attorney in a civil suit. The result is a
schizophrenic 94situation in which the trial counsel's "duty" to
"seek justice" is subservient to the desires of his client, the
convening authority. Although the rights of victims of crime and
the community in general should loom large in the considerations of any prosecuting attorney, the total absence of meaningful discretion in the military prosecutor skews the balancing of
considerations in the military.
One can only speculate why Professor Bishop omitted the
problem of the role of the trial counsel from Justice Under Fire,
but its absence diminishes the already limited usefulness of the
book. The reason probably lies in Bishop's view of the role of the
military commander, who is the convening authority. 95 In formulating one aspect of the military discipline argument, he
states, "Since discipline is a responsibility of the military commander, he should have some control of the machinery by which
it is enforced .... "96 The false premise upon which this view is
based is that the commander cannot have discipline unless he
has control of the mechanism for enforcing it. This Sands-ofIwo-Jima rationale is out of touch with reality and retards reform of the military justice system.
First, this view overlooks the all too obvious fact that the
modern military does not consist of "an aggregation of men
(mostly in the most criminally prone age brackets) who have
strong appetites, strong passions, and ready access to deadly
weapons. ' 97 As another reviewer of Justice Under Fire noted,
"[Today's military] is composed of relatively well-educated personnel trained in highly technical jobs and enjoying more individual rights than ever before in history."9 8 With the change in
modern warfare from a manpower-intensive to a hardwareintensive situation, the military now must recruit persons with
the intellectual ability to understand and operate highly sophisticated' equipment. But the young recruit who is capable of operating a computer that controls a missile guidance system is also
likely to be capable of analyzing the reasons that call for its use.

11 ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY,
11 BISHOP, supra note 6, at 24, 27-30, 300.

96 Id. 24.
97Id. 23.
98 Sherman, supra note 5, at 377-78.

Ethical Consideration 7-13 (1971).
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This inevitably produces a different relationship between the
commander and his troops than inheres when the commander is
ordering his men, on pain of being sent to prison, to charge a
machine gun emplacement. 9
Regardless of whether the changed nature of modern warfare and the higher intellectual capability of today's military personnel justify elimination of the role of the commander in military justice, the military commanders themselves have little or no
interest in maintaining their pervasive involvement with the
military criminal justice system. My experience indicates that
most military commanders care little about military justice except
in the most serious cases, and that they delegate the disciplinary
function to the most junior or most incompetent officer in their
command. Most commanders never want to hear a word from
the discipline officer. Discussions with numerous commanding
officers have convinced me that they would prefer to have the
entire matter of criminal justice reassigned to an organization
controlled by the Judge Advocates General, with its own police
force, detention facilities, prosecutors, defense counsel, and
military judges. Most commanders would rather call a military
police officer and have an offender removed from their command, than handle the matter themselves. If the commanders
are ready to abandon the present system, Professor Bishop's defense of it may be even more hollow than it appears.
The military system of appellate review receives brief treatment in Justice Under Fire.10 0 Again, however, this treatment is
out of touch with reality. Of review at the lower levels, Professor
Bishop states:
Even the least serious cases--those in which the sentence does not exceed six months' confinement-must
be reviewed by the convening authority and his Staff
Judge Advocate or (if he has none) by a military lawyer
in a higher command. Of such automatic review it may
at least be said that it is free, that it is more than the
accused would get in civilian courts, and that he has
nothing to lose. 1° 1
This is not only the "least" that can be said for the system; it is
also the most.
99See Webster, Disciplining the All-Volunteer Force, 100 U.S. NAVAL INSTITUTE
PROCEEDINGS, Nov. 1974, at 33; West, Reflections on the Military Organization, NAVAL WAR
COLLEGE REV. May-June 1974, at 26.
100 See BISHOP, supra note 6, at 38-43.
101 Id. 38-39 (footnote omitted).
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Military defendants usually are tried by special courtsmartial and, if convicted, given a sentence that does not include
a bad conduct discharge. Unless they petition the Judge Advocate General of their service branch pursuant to article 69,102 the
only review of the summarized record' 0 3 of their case will be by
the convening authority and the supervisory authority, a flag or
general officer.' 0 4 Since only the convening or supervisory authority can stay the execution of confinement adjudged at
trial, 10 5 the defendant will be likely to have served any period of
confinement to which he was
sentenced long before completion
10 6
of review at the local level.
With the exception of the rare case in which findings and
sentence are disapproved or the sentence is reduced as a matter
of clemency, the convening and supervisory authorities generally
uphold the findings and sentences placed before them. On the
other hand, they do reduce sentences below the level requiring
review by the Court of Military Review in order to avoid reversals of trial court errors or unfavorable publicity for the local
command.
Military appellate review at the local level is largely a waste
of time and money. A more efficient and honest system would
eliminate automatic post-trial review and place the responsibility
of appealing on the defense. At the conclusion of a trial resulting
in conviction, the accused should be informed of his right to
appeal by giving notice of appeal within ten days.' 0 7 No transcript should be prepared except upon notice of appeal by the
defense, provided, however, that once such notice is given, those
portions of the record of trial requested by the defense or the
prosecution should be produced verbatim regardless of the severity of the sentence adjudged.
To give meaning to such an appellate system, the military
judge should have the authority to stay, conditionally or uncon102 Uniform Code of Military Justice art. 69, 10 U.S.C. § 869 (1970). See MCM, supra
note 14, 103.
'"2 See Uniform Code of Military Justice arts. 38(c), 54, 10 U.S.C. §§ 838(c), 854
(1970); MCM, supra note 14, 83 & apps. 9-10.
104 See Uniform Code of Military Justice arts. 60-65, 10 U.S.C. §§ 860-65; MCM,
supra note 14,
84-91.
1o5 See Uniform Code of Military Justice art. 71(d), 10 U.S.C. § 871(d) (1970); MCM,
supra note 14,
88(d), (f), 98.
106 This problem should be eased somewhat by the decision of COMA requiring that
if the accused has been in confinement, review by the convening authority must be
completed within ninety days of the end of the trial, or the charges and specifications will
be dismissed. See Dunlap v. Convening Authority, 23 U.S.C.M.A. 135, 48 C.M.R. 751
(1974).
107 This is consistent with the standard used in criminal cases in the federal courts.
See FED. R. CRI. P. 32(a)(2).
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ditionally, execution of the sentence pending appeal. In seeking

a stay, the burden should be on the defense to demonstrate by a
preponderance of the evidence that the accused "will not flee or

pose a danger to any other person or the community."' 08 Decisions on stay of execution of a sentence should be appealable by
either side to the Judge Advocate General, and the defense
should have the right to appeal an adverse ruling to the Court of
Military Review.
My personal knowledge of the military appellate system
does not extend to review of cases by the Courts of Military
Appeals. My association with attorneys assigned to the Naval
Appellate Review Activity indicates that they face many of the
same problems found at the trial level. The judges assigned to
the Courts of Military Review are, like their counterparts at the
trial level, merely serving a single tour of duty in a long military
career. Most of the judges are former staff judge advocates who
primarily are interested in saving convictions. The usual ground
for reversal of a conviction is some defect in the form of the
convening order or the post-trial review, and it is unusual to
read a decision of a Court of Military Review that comes to grips
with a major issue of law.
Appellate defense counsel are subject to the same subtle and
overt pressures that affect trial defense counsel. As the percentage of appellate defense counsel who are "career oriented" increases, with the end of the draft, the likelihood of a more
cooperative attitude on their part also increases. Moreover, the
judges of the Courts of Military Review often sit on the selection
board that chooses the director and assistant director of the appellate defense sections. Finally, the appellate defense lawyers
have no separate funding and rely completely on the Judge Advocate General's office for lawyers, support personnel, and other
necessary resources. In short, the appellate review system of the
military is no better or worse than the trial system it reviews. It
has the same corruptions and requires the same type of reform.
No review of Justice Under Fire can fail to note Professor
Bishop's omission of the two most common forms of "punishment" meted out by the military-nonjudicial punishment'0 " and
administrative discharges. 110 Although neither carries the stigma
attached to a conviction by a court-martial, both constitute sig108FED. R. CRIM. P. 46(c).

1""See Uniform Code of MilitaryJustice art. 15, 10 U.S.C. § 815 (1970); MCM, supra
note 14, U 128-35. Professor Bishop mentions nonjudicial punishment twice. BISHOP,
supra note 6, at 47 n.14, 301.
110 Professor Bishop mentions the use of administrative discharges only as an alternative to maintaining court-martial jurisdiction over retired regular officers. See BISHOP,
supra note 6, at 76, 107 n.49.
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nificant disciplinary measures that can have serious consequences for an individual. Both topics have received extensive
discussion elsewhere,"' and they are noted here only because
their omission constitutes a major flaw injustice Under Fire.
Professor Bishop's style may be the best feature of his book,
and it tends to make up for much of what is lacking in substance.
It is a style that will grate on the liberal and tickle the conservative. Although Bishop is defensive at times and tends to overreact to the rhetoric of the more strident critics of military justice, by and largeJustice Under Fire is lucid, easy reading. This is
no small accomplishment in an area filled with highly technical
legal structures and a language of its own. Throughout the book,
Bishop demonstrates a sincere respect for history and tradition;
but in spite of an admirable sense of rationalism, he rarely
demonstrates a willingness to recognize that fundamental
changes have occurred in the mission, methods of warfare, and
personnel makeup of the military in recent years, and that
changes in military justice should also come about. Surely the
worst aspect of Professor Bishop's style is his unbecoming use of
ad hominem innuendo in describing the critics of military justice.
The usefulness of Justice Under Fire is open to serious doubt.
The book has no substantial value as an aid to training attorneys
in the representation of military clients. Besides being too general, it is out of date and out of touch with current military
practice. For the student, the book could serve as an introduction to a well hidden cul-de-sac of American law, but it is an
unreliable source on almost every real issue in the field. The
scholar is not likely to find much of interest in this volume, for it
is not the product of new or original research. The book is
probably most useful as general background reading for military
lawyers and legislators. The former can always benefit from a
better understanding of the context of military law. The latter
can use anything that goes beyond the pabulum disseminated by
the Pentagon and its more vocal adversaries.
Justice Under Fire can best be characterized as a book that is
well worth reading but not to be taken too seriously. It provides
no significant insights into means of improving the condition of
justice in the military. On the other hand, it offers a well-drawn
and, at times, forceful argument for the traditionalist viewpoint.
On balance, Justice Under Fire is likely to have some influence on
the future of American military law, but that influence will
probably not be sufficient to persuade a well-informed Congress
to retain the present system of military justice.
I See Imwinkelried & Gilligan, supra note 14; Lunding, supra note 84; Comment,
supra note 84; Note, supra note 14.
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